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physically fit, and have unimpeachable 
integrity and judgment." /d. at 561-62, 
565 A.2d at 68o (quoting Von Raab, 109 
S. Ct. at 1393). Likewise, drug use by 
employees required to carry firearms 
wou1d jeopardize public safety. Jd. The 
court of appeals compared the work of 
the customs' officers with that of police 
and ftre fighters and found the City to 
have similar governmental interests. Id. 
at 562-63, 565 A.2d at 681. The court 
noted that the police are also involved in 
front-line drug interdiction within their 
jurisdiction and are permitted to carry 
ftrearms whether on duty or off. /d. In 
addition, ftre fighters are "charged with 
duties to repond quickly and effectively 
at a moment's notice," and their actions 
have implications on the life and prop-
erty of others. /d. Thus, the court of 
appeals held that the City's interest in the 
safety of personnel, co-workers, and the 
public outweighed the privacy interests 
of the police and ftre fighters. /d. at 566, 
565 A.2d at 683. 
Finally, the court of appeals held that 
since there was not a great privacy ex-
pectation in the drug analysis of an 
employee's urine produced in regular 
examinations, requiring a warrant would 
add little protection to the individual's 
privacy. /d. at 563-64, 565 A.2d at 681. 
The purpose of a warrant is to protect the 
privacy interests by assuring citizens sub-
ject to a search or seizure that such intru-
sions are not the random or arbitrary acts 
of the government. /d. The court of ap-
peals concluded that the warrant pur-
poses were not jeopardized in United 
Food because the City's program re-
quired suspicionless drug testing in the 
context of an employee's physical exam-
ination. /d. at 564, 565 A.2d at 682. Con-
sequently, the City did not exercise 
discretion in determining when an em-
ployee would be tested for drugs. /d. 
By its decision in United Food, the 
court of appeals has adopted the prevail-
ing law set fotth by the Supreme Court 
in its decisions in Skinner and Von Raab. 
Moreover, the court has broadened the 
suspicionless search exception to the 
fourth amendment to include drug test-
ing of police and ftre ftghters when con-
ducted during annual physical 
examinations. 
-Ellen W. Cohill 
St Luke Evangelical Lutheran 
Church, Inc. v. Smith: REASONABLE 
AITORNEY'S FEFS MAY BE 
CONSIDERED BY TIIEJURYWHEN 
AWARDING PUNITIVE DAMAGES 
The Court of Appeals of Maryland in a 
4-3 decision held that attorney's fees of a 
prevailing party may now be considered 
by a jury in determining an award of 
punitive damages. St. Luke Evangelical 
Lutheran Church, Inc. v. Smith, 318 Md. 
337, 568 A.2d 35 (1990). The court's 
holding represents a departure from the 
American rule requiring each party to a 
lawsuit provide for his or her own costs 
of litigation. 
Ginny Ann Smith sought compensa-
tory and punitive damages from David 
Buchenroth, a pastor at St. Luke Evangel-
ical Lutheran Church (St. Luke's). She 
alleged he defamed her character and 
invaded her privacy when he knowingly, 
or with reckless disregard for the truth, 
communicated false statements to 
church members about her sexual in-
volvement with a married church offi-
cial. Ms. Smith joined St. Luke's as a 
defendant on the theory that by dismiss-
ing her from her job it had ratifted the 
injurious statements of its agent, Pastor 
Buchenroth. 
At trial, the Circuit Court for Montgom-
ery County permitted Ms. Smith to pre-
sent evidence of the amount of her 
attorney's fees on the issue of punitive 
damages. The jury found in her favor and 
awarded her compensatory and punitive 
damages against both Pastor Buchenroth 
and St. Luke's. 
The court of special appeals reversed, 
holding that during jury selection Ms. 
Smith was erroneously allowed twice the 
number of peremptory strikes permitted. 
Ms. Smith sought review of the decision 
in the court of appeals. St. Luke's cross-
petitioned, contending that the trial 
court erred in allowing the jury to con-
sider Ms. Smith's attorney's fees in its 
award of punitive damages. Both peti-
tions were granted. 
The peremptory strike ruling was 
overturned by the court which held that 
even if error had been committed the 
error was harmless. It then focused on 
the principal issue of the case -whether 
attorney's fees may be considered in de-
termining punitive damages. 
To begin its analysis, the court review-
ed the English rule which awards the 
costs of litigation to the prevailing party. 
St. Luke Church, 318 Md. at 344, 568 
A.2d at 38. The rule pre-dates the time of 
King Henry VIII and continues to be ap-
plied in English courts today. /d. at 344-
45, 568 A.2d at 38 (citing C. McCormick, 
Handbook on the Law of Damages 234, 
235 (1935)). 
Following its declaration of indepen-
dence, America began a move away from 
the English rule. Statutes fixing the 
amount of attorney's fees recoverable by 
a successful party gave way to attorney 
fee schedules established by a free mar-
ket. In the American system of jurispru-
dence the notion that each litigant to a 
dispute should provide for his or her own 
costs of litigation evolved. There have 
been some exceptions; as where parties 
to a contract agree, in the event of litiga-
tion, the loser will bear all legal expenses, 
or where a statute allows an aggrieved 
party to recover attorney's fees. /d. at 
345-47, 568 A.2d at 39. 
After examining Maryland Ru1e 1-341, 
wherein attorney's fees are imposed 
upon a party acting in bad faith, the court 
stated, "[i]t is reasonable, therefore, to 
conclude that in this state, an award of 
attorney's fees serves, in general, as a 
legislative tool for punishing wrongful 
conduct." /d. at 347, 568 A.2d at 39. The 
court drew a nexus between attorney's 
fees imposed by statute and an award of 
punitive damages in a court proceeding. 
Both, the court observed, have as a main 
goal the punishment of wrongful con-
duct. /d. at 347, 568 A.2d at 40. 
Despite the court's espousal of the 
American rule in Empire Realty Co. v. 
Fleisher, 269 Md. 278, 305 A.2d 144 
(1973), the court distinguished the case 
explaining that punitive damages were 
not at issue and thus it had declined to 
decide whether fee shifting was appro-
priate in a punitive damages case. St. 
Luke Church, 318 Md. at 348, 568 A.2d 
at 40. The court, however, did agree with 
the prevailing view that attorney's fees 
not be considered when awarding com-
pensatory damages in an attempt to make 
the successful claimant whole. The court 
said that where a party's wrongful con-
duct warrants the imposition of punitive 
damages, the remedy is appropriate. It 
found support for the premise in the 
Restatement (Second) ofTorts § 914 and 
comment a (1979). St. Luke Church, 318 
Md. at 350, 568 A.2d at 41. 
The court next noted, of the seventeen 
states having considered the issue, nine 
have adopted the view that in cases 
where punitive damages are properly at 
issue, the costs of litigation may be con-
sidered in the measurement of an award. 
/d. at 349-50, 568 A.2d at 41. States de-
clining to follow this view contend that 
this form of remedy is entirely compen-
satory in nature, and not a valid means of 
computing punitive damages. They also 
contend that it improperly impinges 
upon the jury's discretionary power to 
fix the amount of punitive damages. /d. 
at 350, 568 A.2d at 41. 
In response, the court of appeals 
stated: 
It is true that an award of attorney's 
fees reimburses a plaintiff for his 
out-of-pocket legal expenses. When 
viewed solely in this light such fees 
may seem to be wholly compensa-
tory in function. Yet, when viewed 
in the context of the long-standing 
prohibition against awarding 
attorney's fees, and the fact that 
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when they are awarded, they most 
often serve as a statutorily-imposed 
punitive measure, the need to in-
clude them in compensatory dam-
ages diminishes. Under this view, 
attorney's fees would seem to be an 
appropriate consideration in mea-
suring an award of punitive dam-
ages. 
Id at 350-51, 568 A2d at 41. 
The court was equally unimpressed by 
the argument that jury discretion would 
be affected. To the contrary, the court 
saw it as an opportunity to provide 
needed guidance to the jury. Citing 
Browning-Ferris Indus., Inc. v. Kelco 
Disposa4 Inc., 492 U.S. 257 (1989), it 
pointed to the Supreme Court's concern 
over the lack of direction provided to 
juries in measuring the amount of puni-
tive damages. St. Luke Church, 318 Md. 
at 351-52, 568A.2d at 42. The amount of 
a prevailing party's legal fees would fur-
nish a degree of guidance to the jury not 
previously provided. Id. 
The court looked at the approaches 
taken by certain states which allow con-
sideration of attorney's fees in the award 
of punitive damages. It rejected the Con-
necticut approach which limits the 
award of punitive damages to the amount 
of attorney's fees incurred by the prevail-
ingparty./d. at352-53, 568A2dat42-43. 
Rather, the court agreed with the Kansas 
approach where the amount of 
attorney's fees is merely one objective 
factor for the jury to consider. Id. 
Thus, the court of appeals reversed the 
court of special appeals and reinstated 
the jury's punitive damage award. The 
decision satisfied two of the court's 
goals. By presenting the jury with evi-
dence of a prevailing claimant's 
attorney's fees, the jury is provided with 
helpful guidance in measuring an award 
of punitive damages as well as a meaning-
ful way to punish the wrongdoer for 
flagrant misconduct. 
-john A. Nolet 
F.T.C v. SuperiorCourtTrialLaw-
yers Ass'n: A BOYC01T BY A GROUP 
OF lAWYERS CONSTI1UfED AN 
AGREEMENf TO FIX PRICES IN 
VIOlATION OF TilE ANTITRUST 
STA1UI'ES 
In F. T. C v. Superior Court Trial Law-
yers Association, 110 S. Ct. 768 (1990), 
the Supreme Court held that an agree-
ment among a group of trial lawyers to 
refuse representation of indigent crimi-
nal defendants until the government in-
creased their compensation amounted to 
price-fiXing. The Court reasoned that the 
expressive component of such a boycott 
was not protected by the ftrst amend-
ment and did not create an exception to 
the antitrust statutes. As a result, the 
price-fiXing agreement was held to be a 
per se violation of section 1 of the Sher-
man Act and section 5 of the Federal 
Trade Commission Act. 
Pursuant to the District of Columbia's 
Criminal Justice Act (CJA), lawyers in 
private practice were appointed and 
compensated to represent indigent de-
fendants in various criminal cases. With 
the majority of appointments going to a 
group of about 100 lawyers referred to as 
"CJA regulars." These cases represented 
approximately 85% of the total caseload 
in the District. "After 1970, the Criminal 
Justice Act set fees at $30 per hour for 
court time and $20 per hour for out-of-
court time, and despite a 147 percent 
increase in the consumer price index, 
compensation remained at those levels 
until the boycott" occurred. Id. at 786 
(Brennan,]., dissenting). 
In 1982, the respondents, Superior 
Court Trial Lawyers Association 
(SCTIA), unsuccessfully attempted to 
persuade the District to raise rates. As a 
result, in 1983, the SCTIA members met 
and agreed not to accept any new cases 
after September 6, 1983, unless legisla-
tion was passed providing for an increase 
in rates. When the legislation was not 
passed, 90% of the SCTIA members re-
fused to accept new assignments. 
The boycott had a severe impact on 
the District's criminal justice system. 
Within days, the District's government 
offered the SCTIA a temporary increase 
to $35 per hour with a permanent in-
crease to $45 per hour for out-of-court 
time and $55 per hour for court time. The 
SCTIA accepted the offer and ended the 
boycott. 
The Federal Trade Commission (FTC), 
however, filed a complaint against the 
SCTIA alleging that the agreement was a 
restraint of trade and characterized the 
SCTIA's conduct as a conspiracy to ftx 
prices. The complaint was heard before 
an administrative law judge (ALJ) who 
recognized the violation of the antitrust 
laws, but dismissed the complaint be-
cause the increased fees would have a 
beneficial effect. The increased fees 
would attract new CJA lawyers and allow 
the current CJA lawyers to reduce their 
caseload in order to provide better rep-
resentation. /d. at 773. 
The FTC disagreed, asserting that as a 
result of the boycott, the city would 
spend an additional4 to 5 million dollars 
a year for the same legal services. Id. 
Accordingly, the FTC filed a cease-and-
desist order to prevent the SCTIA from 
initiating a similar boycott in the future. 
!d. 
The court of appeals found that the 
SCTIA boycott contained elements of 
expression warranting first amendment 
protection. Therefore, a restriction on 
this form of expression could not be 
justified unless the restriction was no 
greater than what was necessary to pro-
tect an important governmental right. I d. 
at 774 (citing United States v. O'Brien, 
391 U.S. 367 (1968)). The court con-
cluded that the O'Brien test could not be 
satisfied by the application of an other-
wise appropriate per se rule of antitrust 
law, but instead required the enforce-
ment agency to prove, rather than pre-
sume, that the Sherman Act was violated. 
Id. (citing Superior Court Trial Lawyers 
Ass'n v. F. T. C, 856 F.2d 226, 248-50 (D.C. 
Cir. 1988)). The court of appeals, there-
fore, vacated the cease-and-desist order 
and remanded the case for a determina-
tion of whether the SCTIA actually pos-
sessed "significant market power," 
which would justify the restriction of 
their first amendment rights. 
The Supreme Court reversed, con-
cluding that the SCTIA's boycott was per 
se violative of section 1 of the Sherman 
Act and section 5 of the Federal Trade 
CommissionAct. F.T.C, 110S.Ct.at774. 
As the FTC, the ALJ, and-the court of 
appeals all agreed, the SCTIA's boycott 
constituted a classic restraint of trade 
within the meaning of section 1 of the 
Sherman Act. /d. The Court rejected the 
boycott's social justifications, as well the 
SCTIA's objective in bringing about fa-
vorable legislation. /d. at 776. In addition, 
the Court reasoned that because the 
SCTIA's objective was to gain an eco-
nomic advantage for those participating 
in the boycott, the conduct was not pro-
tected by the first amendment. /d. at 778. 
The Court pointed out that constitutional 
protection does not apply "to a boycott 
conducted by business competitors who 
stand to profit financially from a lessen-
ing of competition in the boycotted mar-
ket." Id. at 777 (quoting Allied Tube & 
Conduit Corp. v. Indian Head, Inc., 486 
U.S. 492, 508 (1988)). 
The Court then considered whether 
the court of appeals was correct in creat-
ing a new exception to the per se rules 
of antitrust liability. The court of appeals 
relied on United States v. O'Brien, 391 
U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien violated a fed-
eral statute when he burned his Selective 
Service registration certificate on the 
steps of a Boston courthouse. In affirm-
ing his conviction, the Court concluded 
that the statute's incidental restriction on 
O'Brien's freedom of expression was no 
greater than necessary to further the 
government's interest in requiring regis-
trants to have valid certificates continu-
ally available. F.T.C., 110 S. Ct. at 778. In 
light of O'Brien, the court of appeals held 
that the expressive component of the 
SCTIA's boycott compelled the "courts 
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